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The Religious Employer Exemption Under Title
VII: Should a Church Define
Its Own Activities?
In Vigars u. Valley Christian Center,' a librarian was
presumably terminated by a parochial school for the sin of
being pregnant out of wedlock. The district court precluded
summary judgment until it determined whether the librarian was terminated because she was pregnant or because
she had an adulterous relationship. If she was terminated
for adultery, then her religious employer was exempt under
Title VII's provisions. However, if she was terminated for
being pregnant, then the religious employer was liable under Title VII.
The district court was interpreting the religious employer exemption: "This subchapter [Equal Employment Opportunities] shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, educational institution, or society of its activities."2 The court was concerned with whether under the
exemption a religious employer could discriminate on a
nonreligious basis such as gender. Religious employers are
exempt from Title VII's prohibition of employment discrimination3 in some circumstances. Courts have established that

1. 805 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
2. 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-l(a) (West Supp. 1994). Throughout this Comment
these religious corporations, associations, educational institutions, and societies will
be referred to collectively as religious employers.
3. 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-2(a) (West Supp. 1994). The statute states:
I t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
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this religious employer exemption does not permit religious
employers to discriminate on the basis of race, gender, or
national originO4However, a problem arises when determining whether this exemption allows religious employers to
adopt employment practices rooted in sincere religious belief
and doctrine that have a disparate impact on or that facially discriminate against individuals because of their race,
sex, or national origin.
The federal circuit courts are split on the extent of
protection that religious employers receive under the exemption. The Ninth and Fourth Circuits have read the exemption narrowly, deciding that employment practices that violate Title VII on a nonreligious basis are prohibited regardless of whether they are religiously based or not.5 Conversely, the Third and Fifth Circuits give the exemption a broader reading, holding that religious based employment practices should be given some deference, even when they violate
Title VII on a nonreligious basis.6
This Comment charts the history of the religious employer exemption, the differing interpretations in the circuit

color, religion, sex, or national origin.
4. Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164,
1166 (4th Cir. 1985) ("While the language of [the exemption] makes clear that religious institutions may base relevant hiring decisions upon religious preferences,
Title VII does not confer upon religious organizations a license to make those same
decisions on the basis of race, sex, or national origin."), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020
(1986); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir.) ("Congress did not
intend that a religious organization be exempted from liability for discriminating
against its employees on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin."), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).
5. For the Fourth Circuit position, consider Rayburn v. General Conference
of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir. 1985) ("The language and
the legislative history of Title VII both indicate that the statute exempts religious
institutions only to a narrow extent."), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986). For the
Ninth Circuit position, consider EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d
1272, 1277 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that the argument for broadly exempting religious employers is not supported by legislative history).
6. For the Third Circuit position, consider Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951
(3rd Cir. 1991) ("With sensitivity to the constitutional concerns that would be
raised by a contrary interpretation, we read the exemption broadly."). For the Fifth
Circuit position, consider McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560-61 (5th
Cir.) ("Congress did not intend, through the nonspecific wording of the applicable
provisions of Title VII, to regulate the employment relationship between church
and minister."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972). The Fifth Circuit has more
recently narrowed its view of the religious employer exemption. See cases cited
infra note 58.

RELIGIOUS EMPLOYER EXEMPTION
courts, and proposes a solution relying on a recent Supreme
Court decision,? the First Amendment religion clauses, and
the language of the exemption. This Comment addresses the
extent to which a religious employer has the right to determine its own doctrine, goals, and method of pursuing those
goals. Specifically, this Comment addresses the obligations of
a religious employer under Title VII and whether the courts
should obligate religious employers to change their religiously based employment practices to appease the dictates of
Title VII. This Comment concludes that the obligations of a
religious employer under Title VII should be based on
whether the employment practice is religiously based rather
than on whether the employment practice discriminates on a
nonreligious basis o r whether the activities of the employee
in question are central to the religion's mission.
EMPLOYER
EXEMPTION
UNDERTHE CIVIL
11. THE RELIGIOUS
RIGHTSACT OF 1964 AS AMENDED IN 1972

A. The Exemption Protects Religious Employers From the
Full Effect of Title VII
As originally enacted, the religious employer exemption
under Title VII was fairly narrow. It covered "a religious
corporation, association, or society with respect to employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association or society of its religious activities."' However, in 1972,
the exemption was broadened to exempt religious employers
from Title VII in all of their activities, not just their religious a c t i ~ i t i e s . It
~ is this 1972 broadening amendment
which is viewed differently among the circuit courts.
The Ninth Circuit has viewed the 1972 amendment as
only a slight broadening of the exemption, holding that it
did not "broadly exempt[] religious organizations from charges of discrimination based on nonreligious ground^."'^ That
7. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U S . 327 (1987).
8. 42 'U.S.C. !j 2000e-l(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
9. 42 U.S.C. !j 2000e-l(a) (Supp. IV 1992) ("This subchapter shall not apply
. . . to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work
c o ~ e c t e dwith the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.") (emphasis added).
10. EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1277 (9th Cir.
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court explained, "Congress [has] consistently rejected proposals to allow religious employers to discriminate on grounds
other than religion."" Alternatively, the Third Circuit has
read the exemption broadly, being "persuaded that Congress
intended the explicit exemptions to Title VII to enable religious organizations to create and maintain communities
composed solely of individuals faithful to their doctrinal
practices, whether or not every individual plays a direct role
in the organization's 'religious a~tivities.'"'~

B. The Debates Over the Religious Employer Exemption Are
at Best Inconclusive as to Whether the Exemption Should Be
Read Broadly or Narrowly
Although the conflicting circuits cite the legislative debates of the 1964 legislation and the 1972 amendment in
support of their differing views,13 the debates are a t best
inconclusive. The 1964 Civil Rights Act, which originally
passed the House, contained a broad exemption entirely
excluding religious employers from the Act. l4 The Senate
wrote a substitute bill which contained a more limited exemption allowing a religious organization to employ individuals of a particular religion only if they performed work
connected with the organization's religious activities. After
debate in the Senate this substitute bill was passed in both
the Senate and the House?
With respect to the 1972 amendment, some senators
proposed that religious employers be completely removed
from the jurisdiction of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commis~ion,'~but these proposals were rejected.'? The
subsequent Senate proposals only broadened the scope of the
exemption to cover employees who performed nonreligious
activities. This broadened exemption was proposed in an
effort to allow religious organizations to create communities
faithful to their religious principle^.'^ These proposals were

Id.
Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1991).
See Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1276-77; Little, 929 F.2d at 949-51.
H.R. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 703 (1963).
110 CONG. REC. 12,812 (1964); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (1970).
118 CONG. REC. 1982 (1972).
Id. at 1995.
See id. at 1994 (discussing the rights of parochial schools to hire only
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enacted into law and remain with the current statute.lg A
section by section analysis of the statute concluded that religious employers remain "subject to the provisions of Title
VII with regard t o race, color, sex, or national origin."20

C. The Clause "Of a Particular Religion" Allows Religious
Employers to Create Communities Consistent with Their
Religious Beliefs
The language "of a particular religion" is found in both
the original and the amended versions of the e~emption.~'
The Third Circuit found this language determinative and
searched for a d e f i n i t i ~ n .It
~ ~looked to the definition of
"religion" found in the
The definition of "religion"
under Title VII requires an employer to "reasonably accommodate" an employee's religious practices unless it would
cause "undue hardship" on the employer.24 The court determined that this definition of "religion" should be read broadly, but did not find any indication in the legislative history
that Congress considered the effects of this definition on the
scope of the religious employer exemption.25 However, the
Third Circuit concluded, "The permission to employ only persons 'of a particular religion' includes permission to employ
persons whose beliefs and conduct are consistent with the
employer's religious precepts."26

members of their faith a s teachers).
19. Id. at 7170; see 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-l(a) (West Supp. 1994).
20. Id. at 7167.
2000e-l(a) (1970) with 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-l(a) (West
21. Compare 42 U.S.C.
Supp. 1994) ("particular religions" is in both versions of the act).
22. Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 950 (3rd Cir. 1991).
23. 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e(j) (1988) (The statute states: "The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.").
24. Id.
25. Little, 929 F.2d at 950.
26. Id. a t 951.
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D. The Religious Employer Exemption Under Title VII
Should Be Interpreted to Allow Religious Employers to Create Communities Consistent with Their Religious Beliefs
1. The issues raised by the circuit courts ouerlook the more
fundamental issue of religious autonomy
When interpreting the religious employer exemption, the
circuit courts have emphasized different aspects of the legislative history to give credibility to their respective interpretations. They seem to be grappling with the issue of whether or not a religious employer in its employment practices
'
under
can discriminate on a nonreligious b a ~ i s . ~However,
the plain language of the exemption a religious employer
may not discriminate on a nonreligious basis. An employer
is only exempt from Title VII "with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religi~n."'~ Under the
plain language of the statute religious employers are only
exempt from Title VII when making employment decisions
that are religiously based. Religious employers are still liable under Title VII if their employment practice is based on
a prohibited classification such as race, gender, or national
origin.
The circuit courts overlook the more fundamental question of whether religions have the right to pursue their own
goals through their employment practices. More specifically,
under Title VII, the question is whether religious employers
are restricted by Title VII when their religiously based employment practices, which presumably aid in the pursuit of
religious goals, disparately impact on nonreligious protected
groups. The circuit courts' discussions of whether the exemption allows religious employers to discriminate on a nonreligious basis overlook the more fundamental issue of religious autonony and the right of religious employers to define themselves through employment practices in ways consistent with their doctrines, even when those doctrines have
a disparate impact on race, gender, or national origin.

27. See infra part 111.
28. 42 U.S.C.8 2000e-l(a) (West Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
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2. Religious employers should be given autonomy to pursue
their religious goals through their employment practices
Without the religious employer exemption, a religious
congregation would violate Title VII when it preferred a
minister of its own faith, over one of another faith, purely
on the basis of religion. The exemption a t the very least
seems aimed a t allowing a religious employer to prefer one
ministerial candidate over another, purely on the basis of
religion.2g However, the application of the exemption is less
clear when it is claimed by a religious employer hiring a
janitor or librarian who the courts view to be less central to
the religion's mission. The application of the exemption is
even further clouded when it is claimed for an employment
practice that has a disparate impact on race, gender, or national origin.
Although circuit courts apply the religious employer
exemption differently in the above three situations, under
the current exemption all three should be analyzed similarly. The religious employer exemption should be read to
illustrate the principle of religious autonomy. The Supreme
Court has articulated the principle that religions must be
allowed to define their own doctrines, goals, and method of
pursuing those goals in its church property decisions.30
This principle rests on the religion clauses of the First

29. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
30. See, e g . , Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (courts can settle church
property disputes as long as there is "no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith"); Serbian E. Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724 (1976) ("[Tlhe First and Fourteenth
Amendments permit hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules
and regulations for internal discipline and government."); Maryland & Va.
Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God, 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (per
curiam) (holding that because the state court's "resolution of the dispute involved
no inquiry into religious doctrine," there was no violation of the First Amendment);
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) ("First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when
church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice."); Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 363 U.S. 190, 190 (1960) (per curiam) (holding that the use and occupancy of a cathedral were " strictly a matter of ecclesiastical government' and as such could not constitutionally be impaired by a state
statute"); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344
U.S. 94, 107-08 (1952) ("Legislation that regulates church administration, the operation of the churches, the appointment of clergy, by requiring conformity to
church statutes . . . prohibits the free exercise of religion.").
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Amendment3' supported by recent federal statutory law.s2
Under the Free Exercise Clause, religions are autonomous
because a government regulation may not burden the free
exercise of religion unless the government has a compelling
interest in the subject of the r e g u l a t i ~ n .Likewise,
~~
under
the Establishment Clause, religions are autonomous because
(1) a statute must have a secular purpose, (2) the primary
effect of the statute must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and (3) the statute must not foster excessive entanglement between government and religioas4
With these First Amendment principles and religious
autonomy in mind, the application of the religious employer
exemption is clearer. A religious employer must be allowed
to determine who it will employ as a means of fulfilling its
mission. S o long as a religion's employment practices are a n
effort to fulfill its mission, it must be given the autonomy
afforded by the First Amendment regardless of the activities
performed by its employee or the disparate impact the practices have on nonreligious protected groups.
31. U.S. CONST.amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .").
32. 42 U.S.C. 4 2000bb (West Supp. 1994).
33. The test used to determine whether or not a statute violates the Free
Exercise Clause was articulated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)
(noting that courts cannot uphold state action that imposes even an "incidental
burden" on the free exercise of religion unless there exists a "compelling state
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to
regulate*) (citations omitted); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the state from compelling Amish parents t o cause their children who have graduated from the eighth grade to attend
formal high school.).
The constitutional analysis of the First Amendment is in transition. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), has changed the analysis of the
Free Exercise Clause. In that case the Court stated "the right of free exercise does
not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law
of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).'" Id. at 879 (citations omitted). The
Religious Freedom Restoration A d of 1993, 42 U.S.C. 4 2000bb (West Supp. 1994),
is the congressional attempt to return to the Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v.
Yoder analysis, requiring the compelling state interest test to be applied when the
government burdens a religion. Although it is questionable whether Congress can
dictate constitutional analysis, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act codifies the
compelling state interest test. Regardless of the constitutional analysis, the Free
Exercise Clause continues to stand for the proposition that a religion should be
allowed to dictate its own doctrine and practices without the burden of governmental interference. Notwithstanding Employment Division v. Smith, this general proposition remains constant.
34. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).

RELIGIOUS EMPLOYER EXEMPTION

111. THE ANALYSISOF THE FEDERALCIRCUITCOURTSIN
APPLYINGTHE RELIGIOUSEMPLOYER
EXEMPTION
The following cases illustrate the differing approaches of
the circuit courts to the religious employer exemption. The
cases are presented in chronological order by circuit to chart
the development of the case law as well as the exemption.
The facts in each case are significant because the activities
held by the employees within the religious organization
determine the outcome in the cases.

A. The Fifth Circuit Distinguishes Between Employee Actiu ities Within Religious Organizations to Alleviate First
Amendment Violations Under Title V71
McClure u. Salvation Army35 establishes a n exception
for ministers under Title VII which other circuit courts
discuss in subsequent cases. This case was decided before
the 1972 amendment to the religious employer exemption, s o
the court had to decide whether the employment activities
.involved were religious. McClure, a female minister, brought
suit against the Salvation Army alleging discrimination on
the basis of sex. Specifically, she received lower wages than
similarly situated males.36 The court held that application
of Title VII in this case would violate the First Amendment.
According to the
the religious employer exemption was "intended to allow a religious organization to employ persons of a particular faith to perform work connected
with the carrying on of their religious activities without
otherwise violating the provisions of Title VII."38 However,
the court concluded that religions may not discriminate "on
the basis of race, color, sex, and national origin."39
Using the "compelling state interest7' test:'
the court
decided that application of Title VII in this case would
violate the First Amendment. It found that "[tlhe relationship between an organized church and its minsters is its

35. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).
36. Id. at 555.
37. Note that this case was decided before the 1972 amendment broadened
the exemption to cover all activities of religious employers, rather than strictly
religious activities. See 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-l(a) (1970).
38. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558.
39. Id.
40. See supra note 33.
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lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the
church seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this
relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime
ecclesiastical concern."41 The court found that a minister's
salary, assignments, and duties are "matters of church administration and government and thus, purely of ecclesiastical cognizance" and that a review of these practices and
decisions would "cause the State to intrude upon matters of
church administration and government which have so many
times before been proclaimed to be matters of singular ecclesiastical concern."42 The court concluded that Congress
did not intend to "regulate the employment relationship
between church and minister."43
While interpreting the religious employer exemption
before the 1972 amendment, which broadened the exemption
to cover all of a religious employer's activities rather than
just its religious activitie~?~
the Fifth Circuit saw the need
to create an exception for ministers. This exception is a
manifestation of the right of religions to be autonomous.
The court found that religions have a First Amendment
right to determine the qualifications and compensation for
their ministers without governmental regulation. To hold
otherwise would infringe on religious autonomy and require
religions t o change employment practices, conceivably based
on religious doctrine, thereby infringing on the First Amendment religion clauses. The 1972 amendment to the religious
employer exemption seems to remove the need for the ministerial exception because it protects all activities of religious
employers, not just the religious activities. Nevertheless, the
ministerial exception continues beyond the 1972 amendment.

41.
42.
43.
44.

McClure, 460 F.2d at 558-59.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 560-61.
See 42 U.S.C.$ 2000e-l(a) (1970).

RELIGIOUS EMPLOYER EXEMPTION

B. If a Religious Employer's Employment Practice Infringes
on a Nonreligious Classification, the Ninth Circuit Only
Allows a Religious Employer T o Violate Title VII when the
Employee's Activities Are Ministerial
1. EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Association
The Ninth Circuit refuses to interpret the 1972 amendment as removing the need for a ministerial exception by
reading the religious employer exemption narrowly when it
impacts nonreligious protected groups. EEOC v. Pacific Press
Publishing A ~ s ' nillustrates
the problems created when
~~
courts disallow religions the autonomy they are entitled to
under the First Amendment religion clauses. Pacific Press, a
nonprofit religious publishing house, required all of its employees to be members of the Seventh-Day Adventists
Church in good standing.46 Lorna Tobler, a female editorial
secretary, had worked for the publishing company for fifteen
years.47 Pacific Press paid its employees according to a
written wage scale which provided married males a higher
rental allowance than single males who received a higher
allowance than females whether married or unmarried.
Tobler brought an action against Pacific Press for the disparate wage scale.
After Pacific Press discovered that Tobler had initiated
charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, her discretionary work load was shifted to other employees, presumably in retaliation for her complaints. Tobler
then filed retaliation charges against the publishing company as well.48 The General Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, the governing body of the church, formed a committee that recommended that Tobler and another female
employee who was pursuing charges against it be terminated from Pacific Press. In accordance with internal procedures, this committee found that both employees had failed
to meet the high standards of biblical teachings and church
authority because they had filed suit against the church,
were a t variance with the church, and were unresponsive to

45.
46.
47.
48.

676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1275.
Id.
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c o ~ n s e l i n g .Both
~ ~ of these actions by Pacific Press were
violations of Title VII, so the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought suit. The district court found the
disparate wage scale and the retaliation to be violations of
Title VII.50
The court addressed two issues in this case:
First, whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibits a religious publishing house from (a) discriminating in wages because of sex, and (b) retaliating
against and ultimately discharging an employee because of
her participation in Title VII proceedings. Second, whether
application of Title VII in the context of this case infringes
the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses [sic] of the
First A~nendment.~'

Pacific Press argued that it was exempt as a religious employer from the provisions of Title VII and, alternatively,
that application of Title VII in this case violated the First
Amendment religion clauses.52
For its analysis of whether Title VII prohibits the publishing company's actions, the court looked to NLRB u.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago.53 That Supreme Court decision
mandated that a court first determine whether the proposed
application of Title VII "would give rise to serious constitutional question^.'"^ If the proposed application of ! M e VII
did give rise to serious constitutional questions, then the
court could only apply the statute in the proposed way if
there was an "affxmative intention of Congress clearly expressed" t o do so.55
The court concluded that Pacific Press was not expressly
or implicitly exempt from the provisions of Title VII in this
case. The court read the exemption narrowly, allowing reli-

49. Id.
50. Id. at 1274.
51. Id. at 1275.
52. Id. at 1276.
53. 440 U.S.490 (1979). In CathoLic Bishop, the Court held that a religiously associated school was not within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) and that there would be a significant risk of infringement on the
religion clauses of the First Amendment if jurisdiction were found. In light of such
a risk, there must be clear congressional intent of NLRB jurisdiction to find such
jurisdiction. Id.
54. Id. at 501.
55. Id.
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gious employers to discriminate on the basis of religious
faith, but holding that such employers are "not immune
from liability for discrimination based on race, sex, national
origin, or for retaliatory actions against employees who exercise their rights under the statute."56 The court cited congressional debate on the exemption and its broadening
amendment5? and Fifth Circuit case law to support its determination that Congress "intended t o prohibit religious
organizations from discriminating among their employees on
the basis of race, sex or national origin."58
Pacific Press argued that Tobler was outside the reach
of Title VII since her job involved religious activities includUning "discretionary and administrative respon~ibilities."~~
der McClure v. Salvation Armye0 and NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, Pacific Press alternatively argued that
application of Title VII violated the First Amendment.e1
The court rejected the Pacific Press argument that the religious employer exemption "applies to all actions taken by an
employer with respect to an employee whose work is connected with the organizations 'religious activitie~.'"~~
The
court found that "Tobler was not a minister, nor an author
of religious texts. Moreover, Press has not shown that her
duties go t o the heart of the church's function in the manner of a minister or a seminary teacher."63 The court concluded that Congress clearly intended Title VII to apply t o
Pacific Press when it discriminated against Tobler.
56. Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1276.
57. Id. at 1276-77.
58. Id. at 1277 (citing EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary,
651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that Title VII did not apply to the employment relationship between the seminary and its faculty, but that applying Title
VII's reporting requirements to the seminary's nonministerial employees did not
violate the religion clauses of the First Amendment), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905
(1982); and EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding
that when a religious institution presents clear and convincing evidence that an
employment practice results "from discrimination on the basis of religion," then the
EEOC has no "jurisdiction to investigate further to determine whether the religious
discrimination was a pretext for some other form of discrimination"; only the relationship between minister and the church is exempt from Title VII; imposing Title
VII requirements on a religious institution does not violate the religion clauses of
the First Amendment), cert. denied, 453 U.S.912 (1981)).
59. Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1277.
60. See supra part IIIA.
61. Pacific Press, 676 F.2d a t 1277.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1278.
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In using the "compelling state interest"
the
court decided that the enforcement of equal pay provisions
on Pacific Press did not conflict with its religious beliefs
because the church "proclaims that it does not believe in
discriminating against women or minority groups, and that
its policy is to pay wages without discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, age, or national s rig in."^ The
court found that the state interest in this case was high
and the impact on religious belief was minimal and so concluded that the Free Exercise Clause was not violated with
respect t o the equal pay provisions of Title VII?
The court had more difficulty determining whether application of the retaliatory provisions of Title VI167violated
the Free Exercise Clause. The court found that there was a
substantial impact on the religious beliefs of the Adventists
Church when the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission prosecuted Pacific Press for taking retaliatory action
based on religious doctrine." The court concluded, however,
that the compelling state interest found in Title VII justified
this substantial impact on religious belief and that the Free
Exercise Clause was not violated by applying Title VII to
the retaliatory actions of Pacific Press?'
The court also found that application of Title VII in
this case did not violate the Establishment Clause by using
the test articulated in Lemon u. Kurtzman." That Supreme
Court decision provides a three-step analysis to determine
whether a statute complies with the Establishment Clause:

See supra note 33.
Pacific Press, 676 F.2d a t 1279.
Id.
42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-3(a) (1981). The statute states:
I t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for
an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling
apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training
programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.

64.
65.
66.
67.

68. 676 F.2d at 1279.
69. Id. at 1279-80.
70. 403 US. 602 (1971).
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(1) the statute must have a secular purpose, (2) the primary
effect of the statute must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and (3) the statute must not foster excessive government entanglement with religi~n.~'The court focused on
whether application of Title VII in this case fostered excessive government entanglement with religion.
Pacific Press argued that application of Title VII in this
case would excessively entangle the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission with religion. To determine this
question the court looked at "the character and purpose of
the institution involved, the nature of the regulation's intrusion into church affairs, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious a ~ t h o r i t y . "Pacific
~~
Press supported their argument by citing N L R B u. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago,73 in which the Supreme Court found a
serious risk of excessive entanglement between the National
Labor Relations Board and religion by enforcing mandatory
collective bargaining provisions a t a religious school.74 The
court distinguished Catholic Bishop from the present case
finding that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
had less authority to continuously supervise than the National Labor Relations Board did.75 The court found that
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission could not
initiate suits to enforce its statutory provisions or issue
coercive orders like the National Labor Relations Board.76
Therefore, the court found no excessive entanglement between the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and
the Adventists Church by applying Title VII to Pacific Press
with regard to the equal pay or retaliatory provision^.^^

2. The Ninth Circuit risked influencing religious doctrine
contrary to the First Amendment religion clauses
The Ninth Circuit in Pacific Press infringed upon religion to a greater degree than they seem to have understood.
The court found that the First Amendment religion clauses
71. Id. at 612-13.
72. Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1282 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
614-15 (1971)).
73. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
74. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U S . at 502-03.
75. Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1282.
76. Id.
77. Id.

586

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994

were not infringed when a religious employer was forced to
alter its employment practices that were arguably religiously
based. By forcing a religious employer to alter its employment practices, the court was tampering with the doctrines
and practices of the religion itself. As Professor Douglas
Laycock has stated, "When the state interferes with the
autonomy of a church, and particularly when it interferes
with the allocation of authority and influence within a
church it interferes with the very process of forming the
religion as it will exist in the future.'y78
This case substantially limits the autonomy of religion.
By scrutinizing and essentially overturning a religious
employer's decisions, the court is limiting the religion's ability to fulfill its religious mission through its employment
practices, simply because the practices do not meet the
court's definition of religious activity. Under this analysis,
courts infringe on the right to freely exercise religion and
possibly entangle themselves in determining religious doctrine.
The Ninth Circuit seemed to neglect the fact that the
employment practices of religious employers are often religiously based and so are a form of religious practice. The
court seemed willing to permit the Title VII violation if
Tobler had been a minister, but since she was only a n
editorial secretary the court was not willing to do so. By
determining which positions were ministerial and central to
the religion, the court was dictating how the religion would
define itself and who it would employ to fulfill its mission.
Likewise, the court ignored the plain language of the
statute, which makes no distinction based on the activities
performed by the employee. In this manner the court risked
becoming the interpreter of religious practice and a fdter
through which employment-related religious practices must
pass. Under such a system, if the practice does not meet
the political touchstone, then the court condemns the practice, thereby influencing the doctrine and forcing religions to
redetermine their missions. This sort of corruption of religious practice and doctrine is contrary to the express intent
of the First Amendment religion clauses.
78. Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The
Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM.L.
REV.1373, 1391 (1981).
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Employment practices that are religiously based are an
exercise of religion, regardless of the employee's activities
within the religious community. Even a n editorial secretary,
like Lorna Tobler, reflects the religious community when she
works for a church-affiliated publishing company. It does not
make a difference whether she edits religious or secular
text, she is still a member of the religious community. As
such she may confront sensitive church issues or deal i n
matters that only the faithful would respect. Under religious
autonomy the religion alone should decide which employees
and which activities necessitate close religious affiliation.
As Professor Stephen L. Carter has stated, "religions, to
be truly free, must be able to engage in practices that the
larger society condemns. The state has a perfect right to
send a message that it is wrong to discriminate . . . but
government must not be allowed to conscript private organizations, least of all religions, to assist."79 Continuing, he
stated that religious autonomy and independence are what
"the First Amendment traditions contemplate and democracy
desperately needs."'
He defined religious autonomy as
meaning that religions "should not be beholden to the secular world, that they should exist neither by the forbearance
of, nor to do the bidding of, the society outside of themselves. It means, moreover that they should be unfettered i n
preaching resistance to (or support of or indifference toward)
the existing order.""
Religious autonomy permits religions to define themselves as they see fit, which is essential to their right to
freely exercise their religion. When the courts influence religious practice and doctrine by invalidating religiously based
employment practices, they run the risk of making religion
meaningless and turning the state's political policies into a
state religion by defining each religion within the state's
political agenda.

79. STEPHENL. CARTER,THE CULTUREOF DISRELIEF34 (1993). On the issue
of employment discrimination by religious employers Professor Carter advocates focusing on whether employee activities are "central acts of faith of a religious community." Id. at 143. However, his arguments supporting religious autonomy reach
the opposite conclusion; and, his analysis based on employee activities is inconsistent with the plain language of the religious employer exemption. See 42 U.S.C. 8
2000e-l(a) (West Supp. 1994).
80. CARTER,supra note 78, at 34.
81. Id. at 34-35.
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3. Religious employers may have valid reasons for observ-

ing employment practices that are contrary to their oficial
doctrine
The Ninth Circuit argued that there was no Free Exercise violation against the Adventists Church, because their
own doctrine was contrary to their employment practi~e.'~
However, the free exercise of religion and the right of religious autonomy are founded on the principle of fluidity of
religious doctrine. Religious employers may have religiously
based reasons for observing an employment practice that is
contrary to the official pronounced doctrine. Official pronouncement of doctrine may not be "a reliable indication of
what the faithful believe. At best the officially promulgated
doctrine of large denominations represents the dominant or
most commonly held view; it cannot safely be imputed to
every believer or every affiliated congregati~n."~~
Likewise, many religions profess to be governed by divine revelation, which may change with different situations.
Inherent in the right to freely exercise religion is the right
to freely change beliefs. Organizations that profess to be
governed by a higher law must be afforded the latitude to
change their official pronouncements as they see fit. The
right to freely exercise religion must include the right to act
contrary to official pronouncements when moved upon by
God to do so. Although it would be more difficult for a
religious employer to show that its employment practice,
which is contrary to the official doctrines of the religion, is
religiously based, the religion should be given the opportunity to do so.
Moreover, as Professor Laycock has argued, religious
organizations may have constitutionally legitimate reasons
for resisting regulations that comply with their official doctrines. First, they may simply be "hypocritically seeking t o
exempt themselves from a moral duty they preach to othe r ~ . ' " ~Although not admirable, this position is still constitutionally permissible because the "free exercise protection
is not limited to churches the government admires.yy85Second, religions may be resisting regulations on principle--"to
82.
83.
84.
85.

See Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1279.
Laycock, supra note 77.
Id. at 1399.
Id.
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avoid creating an adverse precedent that might support
some more objectionable regulation in the future."86 Third,
"[elven if government policy and church doctrine endorse the
same broad goal, the church has a legitimate claim to autonomy in the elaboration and pursuit of that goaYs7 Under this autonomy right, deference must be given to religiously based employment practices, even when those practices seem inconsistent with the religion's official pronouncements.

4. Vigars v. Valley Christian Center
The Northern District Court of California in Vigars u.
Valley Christian Centers8 followed EEOC u. Pacific Press
Publishing Ass'n. In that case Vigars, a librarian, was allegedly fired from a parochial school for being pregnant out of
wedlock. When the school moved for summary judgment on
the Title VII action, it alleged that the termination was not
for the sin of pregnancy out of wedlock, but for the sin of
adultery.89The court decided that if Vigars was terminated
for being pregnant out of wedlock then Title VII applied,
but if the termination was for adultery, then Title VII did
not apply. The court stated, "[Ilt is clear that Title VII
generally applies when a woman has been terminated for
pregnancy, regardless of the reason put forth by the employer as to why that pregnancy justifies terminati~n.'~'
The district court found that under Pacific Press "church
organizations have been held liable under Title VII for benefit and employment decisions which they contended were
based upon religious grounds but which also discriminated
against women based on sex."g1 However, the district
court's finding is contrary to the Ninth Circuit's finding in
Pacific Press that the Adventists Church did not have a
religiously held belief of discrimination against women.92
Finally, the court decided that Title VII did not violate the
First Amendment. It decided that summary judgement must

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
805 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
Id. at 804-5.
Id. at 806.
Id. a t 807.
Pacific Press, 676 F.2d a t 1279. See supra text accompanying note 65.
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be denied because there is a legitimate issue of material
fact as to whether the school terminated Vigars for being
pregnant or for committing a d ~ l t e r y . ' ~
The Northern District of California found that a religious employer could not put forth a reason sufficient to
terminate a n employee for pregnancy, but that termination
for adultery was acceptable. This is the sort of arbitrary
distinction that courts make when permitted to scrutinize
the employment practices of religious employers. With this
decision the court is preferring one employment practice
over another. Although generally such preference is proper,
when a religious employer is involved the court risks preferring one doctrine over another as they are manifest in employment practices.
Employment practices are central to the fulfillment of
religious missions for two reasons. First, they may be expressions of religious belief and as such are part of the
exercise of religion. Second, they create communities that
are working to fulfill religious missions. When courts exercise power over the employment practices of a religious
employer, they risk changing the expression of religious
belief and the creation of communities to fulfill religious
missions. Although the district court may need to determine
whether Vigars was terminated for being pregnant out of
wedlock or committing adultery, the case should not turn on
this issue. Rather, it should turn on whether the employment practice is religiously based (regardless of whether i t
condemns pregnancy out of wedlock or adultery).
Under the plain language of the religious employer
exemption and its legislative history, religious employers
may not discriminate on a nonreligious basis. The ministerial exception of McClure v. Salvation Army and the First
Amendment religion clauses prohibit the application of Title
VII to positions that are central to a religion's mission. The
plain language of the exemption also protects religious employers regardless of whether the activities involved are
secular or religious. Therefore, since the analysis cannot
focus on the activities involved, it must focus on the em-

93. Vigars, 805 F. Supp. at 810. The district court also considered Little v.
Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991) and Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), but
found both inapplicable in the current case. See infra parts III.D., IVA.
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ployment practice itself. The court's focus should be on
whether an employment practice is part of a religion's exercise of religion. If it is, then it should be given deference. If
the employment practice is not religiously based, then no
deference should be given t o the employment practice and it
should be treated the same as any other employment
practice of any other employer.

C. The Fourth Circuit Perpetuates the Focus on the
Employee Activities Rather than on the Basis
of the Employment Practice
The Fourth Circuit in Rayburn v. General Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventistsg4 interpreted the religious employer
exemption based on the activities of the employee, rather
than on the religious basis for the employment practice.
Rayburn, a female pastor who was denied a position,
brought a n action charging sexual and racial
discrirninati~n.~~
In applying the NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago ~tandard,~"he court determined that "the language and the legislative history of Title VII both indicate
that the statute exempts religious institutions only to a
narrow extent."g7
Citing EEOC u. Mississippi College,Q8 from the Fifth
Circuit, the court stated that when a religious institution
presents clear and convincing evidence that an employment
practice favors one religion over another, then the religious
exemption of Title VII deprives the EEOC from further
investigation to determine whether the religious discrimination is a "pretext for some other form of discriminati~n."~~
The court continued that it was clear from the exemption that religious employers can discriminate on the basis
of religion, but that "Title VII does not confer upon religious
organizations a license t o make those same decisions on the
basis of race, sex, or national origin."loOThe court viewed
this case as discrimination on the basis of race and gender

772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 US. 1020 (1986).
Id. at 1165.
See supra text of note 53.
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1166.
626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1166.
Id.
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among applicants of the same religion, so, by the clear
intent of Congress, Title VII applied to this case.lO'
Using the "compelling state interest" test,''' the court
found that applying Title VII in this case would violate the
Free Exercise Clause. It reasoned, "The role of an associate
in pastoral care is so significant in the expression and realization of Seventh-day Adventist beliefs that state intervention in the appointment process would excessively inhibit
religious liberty."103 However, the court found that "Title
VII is an interest of the highest order" and therefore some
occasions arise when "the state may justify a n inroad on
religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive
means of achieving some compelling state interest."lo4
The court also found that application of Title VII in
this case would violate the Establishment Clause. It stated
that "the application of Title VII to employment decisions of
this nature would result in an intolerably close relationship
between church and state."lo5 However, the court noted,
"churches are not-and should not be-above the law. . . .
Their employment decisions may be subject to Title VII
scrutiny, where the decision does not involve the church's
spiritual functi~ns."''~ The court decided that Title VII
was not applicable to the employment practices of religions
concerning their pastors even when the practices discriminated on the basis of nonreligious criteria.lo7
In this case, the Fourth Circuit did not apply Title VII
to the religious employer discriminating on a nonreligious
basis only because the employee's activities were closely tied
to the religion's mission. The court relied on the First
Amendment religion clauses, misinterpreting the religious
employer exemption. Even though this analysis resulted
favorably for the religious employer in this case, it distinguished the protection that religious employers received on
the basis of the activities performed by the employee. This
implies that employees whose activities the court views as

101. Id. at 1166-67 & n.2.
102. See supra note 33.
103. Rayburn, 772 F.2d a t 1168.
104. Id. at 1169 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec.
Div., 450 US. 707 (1981)).
105. Id. at 1170.
106. Id. at 1171.
107. Id. at 1172.
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further removed from the religion's mission would not receive protection under the religious employer exemption.
However, the plain language of the exemption protects both
the secular and the religious activities of religious employees, regardless of their centrality to the religion's mission.
Instead of focusing on centrality, the court should focus on
whether the employment practice is religiously based, completely distancing itself from the centrality of the employee's
activities.

D. The Third Circuit Focuses on Whether the Employment
Practice is Religiously Based Rather than on Whether
the Employee's Activities Are Central
to a Religion's Mission
The Third Circuit in Little v. Wuer1108 focused on the
basis for the employment decision, rather than on the activities of the employee, when applying the religious employer
exemption. In this case Susan Long Little was a Protestant
teacher a t a Catholic school.10g She brought suit under
Title VII when the school failed to renew her c ~ n t r a c t . " ~
The St. Mary Magdalene Parish, the operator of the school,
hired Little with full awareness that she was Protestant."' Little did not teach religion, but attended and participated in ceremonies and programs that were intended to
strengthen the Catholic values of the student^."^ She was
a tenured teacher and assumed that her contract would be
renewed unless there was just cause for her termination.ll3 There is no dispute that Little performed well in
her teaching capacity.ll4 The annual contracts contained a
clause that gave the school the right to dismiss a teacher
for "serious public immorality, public scandal, or public rejection of the official teachings, doctrine or laws of the Roman Catholic Church."l15

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 945.
Id. at 946.
Id. at 945.
Id.
Id. at 945-46.
Id. at 945.
Id.
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Little was married when hired? Later, she was &vorced and during a leave of absence was remarried by a
justice of the peace to a second husband who was a baptized, but nonpracticing, member of the Catholic Church.l17
When Little tried to renew her contract with the school, she
was told that she would not be rehired because she had not
pursued "the 'proper canonical process available from the
Roman Catholic Church to obtain validation of her second
marriage.' "'18 Little filed suit. The district court granted
the school's summary judgment motion, finding that the
religious employer exemption exempted the school from liability under Title VII.llg
The court used the Catholic ish hop'^' standard to determine the applicability of Title VII to this case. The court
first decided whether the Free Exercise Clause was violated.
Relying on several cases analyzed above,12' the court recognized the ministerial exception found in the circuit court
decisions. It stated, "Title VII does not apply to the relationships between ministers and the religious organizations
that employ them, even where discrimination is alleged on
the basis of race or sex."122 The court broadened the impact of this ministerial exception, stating, "!L'itle VII has
been interpreted to bar race and sex discrimination by religious organizations towards their nonminister employees.
But attempting to forbid religious discrimination against
nonminister employees where the position involved has any
religious significance is uniformly recognized as constitutionally suspect, if not forbidden."lu
The court also recognized the test found in Mississippi
College: when a religious organization "presents convincing
evidence that the challenged employment practice resulted
from discrimination on the basis of religion," then the religious exemption "deprives the Equal Employment Opportuni116. Id. at 946.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 440 U.S. 490 (1979). See supra note 53.
121. The court relied on Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986); and
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896
(1972). See supra parts 1II.A-C.
122. Little, 929 F.2d at 947.
123. Id. at 947-48 (emphasis added).
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ty Commission of jurisdiction to investigate further to determine whether the religious discrimination was a pretext for
some other form of dis~rimination."'~~
The court determined that there is grave danger in a court determining
who fits into certain religious categories, and that this determination is better left to the discretion of religious authorities and government^.'^^ I t determined that to apply
Title VII in this case, it would have to examine the official
teachings and doctrines of the Catholic Church, which raises
serious constitutional question^.'^^
The court found that applying Title VII to the school's
decisions would "create excessive government entanglement
with religion" violating the Lemon test.12' As support for
this argument the court turned again to Catholic Bishop, i n
which the Supreme Court decided that the National Labor
Relations Board is presumed to have no jurisdiction over
parochial school employees. The court found that the "very
process of inquiry leading to findings and conclusions"
brings excessive entanglement.12' The court quoted from
Professor Douglas L a y c ~ c k ' that
~ ~ "churches have a constitutionally protected interest in managing their own institutions free of government interference."lsO Thus, the court
concluded that interpreting Title VII to apply to the school's
decision may only be done when Congress has shown clear
intent to do so.
In looking a t the legislative history of Title VII, the
court determined that it "suggest[ed] that the sponsors of
the broadened exception were solicitous of religious
organizations' desire to create communities faithful to their
religious principle^."'^^ The court continued, "[Wle are also
persuaded that Congress intended the explicit exemptions to
Title VII to enable religious organizations to create and
maintain communities composed solely of individuals faithful

124. EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 453 U.S.912 (1981), quoted in Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 948 (3d Cir.
1991).
125. Little, 929 F.2d at 948.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 949.
129. Laycock, supra note 77, at 1373.
130. Little, 929 F.2d at 949.
131. Id. at 950.
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to doctrinal practice^."'^^ The court concluded that "it does
not violate Title VII's prohibition of religious discrimination
for a parochial school to discharge a Catholic or a non-Catholic teacher who has publicly engaged in conduct regarded
by the school as inconsistent with its religious principles."ls3
The Third Circuit made the correct inquiries and respected the autonomy of religions to fulfill their mission.
The court stated that governmental infringement on a n
activity with "any religious significance" is "constitutionally
suspect" and probably "f~rbidden."'~Courts should not attempt to determine the religious significance of a n employment activity to a religion. By validating certain employment practices when the employee's activities are sufficiently
religious, courts interfere with the religion's practice and
creation of communities to fulfill its mission. The inquiry of
the court should be whether a certain employment practice
is religiously based, not whether the employee's activities
are religiously significant.

IV. RESOLUTION
OF WHETHERA RELIGIOUSEMPLOYER
SHOULD
BE GIVENAUTONOMYTO PRACTICE
ITSRELIGIONTHROUGHITS EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES
THAT VIOLATETITLE VII
ON NONRELIGIOUS
GROUNDS
A.

Whether the Employee's Activities Are Religious
Should Not Be Determinative

The above-cited circuit courts all acknowledge the ministerial exception to Title VII, found in McClure v. Salvation
Army,135 which allows religious employers to violate Title
VII on grounds other than religion when the employee's
However, the circuit courts do
activities are rnini~terial.'~~
not agree on whether the 1972 amendment to the religious
employer exemption provides this same protection for religious employers when the employee's activities are not ministerial. The 1972 amendment makes no distinction between
132. Id. a t 951.
133. Id.
134. Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991).
135. See supra part 1II.A.
136. Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 947-48 (3d Cir. 1991); EEOC v. PacXic
Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982). See supra part 111.
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religious and nonreligious activities, suggesting that the
activities performed by an employee should not be determinative of the breadth of the exemption.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the
religious employer exemption distinguishes between religious
and nonreligious activities in Corporation of the Presiding

Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos.13' I n that case, the Court held that the religious
employer exemption applied to employees performing nonreligious as well as religious activities. A janitor of a churchsponsored gymnasium was discharged after not qualifying
The Court decided that the
for a temple re~0rnmend.l~~
church had the right to discriminate on the basis of religion
even if the employee was not performing religious activities.
While applying the first prong of the Lemon test the Court
stated:
[Ilt is a significant burden on a religious organization to
require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which
of its activities a secular court will consider religious. The
line is hardly a bright one, and an organization might
understandably be concerned that a judge would not understand its religious tenets and sense of mission.139

In analyzing the second prong of the Lemon test, the
Court stated, "A law is not unconstitutional simply because
it allows churches to advance religion, which is their very
purpose. For a law to have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon,
it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and infl~ence."'~~
This gives great deference to Congress to create exemptions
for religions from statutes that violate the First Amendment
religion clauses. The Court further stated, "[Tlhere is ample
room for accommodation of religion under the Establishment
Clause. Where, as here, government acts with the proper
purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of
religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption
come packaged with benefits to secular entities."14'
137. 483 U.S.327 (1987).
138. Id. a t 330. A temple recommend is "a certificate that [ a person] is a
member of the Church and eligible to attend its temples." Id.
139. Id. at 336.
140. Id. at 337.
141. Id. at 338 (citations omitted).
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The Supreme Court did not strictly scrutinize the religious employer exemption but rather applied a rational relationship test. The Court stated:
[Wlhere a statute is neutral on its face and motivated by
a permissible purpose of limiting governmental interference
with the exercise of religion, we see no justification for
applying strict scrutiny to a statute that passes the Lemon
test. The proper inquiry is whether Congress has chosen a
rational classification to further a legitimate end.142

The Court is again deferring to Congress to create exemptions for religions in an effort t o accommodate religious free
exercise. The Court seems to be acknowledging the right of
religious autonomy over the pursuit of its goals and mission
through employment practices. On the facts of this case, the
Supreme Court is protecting the religion's right to evince its
religious beliefs through its employment practices regardless
of the nature of the activities involved.
In Amos, the Supreme Court found that there is no
distinction within the religious employer exemption between
religious and nonreligious activities. Courts should not get
involved in characterizing whether an activity is central to
a n organization's religious mission. So long as the employment practice is religiously based, and not a facade to some
other interest, it should be given the benefit of the exemption, regardless of whether the court objectively values the
practice or not. This holds true even when the religiously
based employment practice violates Title VII on nonreligious
grounds. Under this decision the ministerial exception becomes unnecessary, since there is no longer a distinction
within the exemption between ministerial and nonministerial
positions, o r religious and nonreligious activities.

B. When Religious Employers Are Able to Prove by Clear
and Convincing Evidence that Their Employment Practice Is
Religiously Based, the Court Should Grant the Employer
the Benefit of the Exemption
In Little v. Wuerl, the court amplified a test articulated
in Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day
~ d v e n t i s t s ' and
~ ~ EEOC v. Mississippi ~ollege.'" It stat142. Id. at 339.
143. 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.1020 (1986).
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ed that a religious employer is exempt from Title VII if it
can show by clear and convincing evidence that its employment practice is religiously based. This test seems to meet
the needs of the two conflicting interests. A religion should
not be able to violate Title VII except for religious purposes.
This limitation is stated specifically in the religious exemption itself.145 However, if a religious employer by its religiously based employment practices violates Title VII on
grounds other than religion, then that employer must show
by clear and convincing evidence that its employment practices are religiously based. By so doing the employer falls
under the exemption and the court's scrutiny of the employment practice ends.

The circuit courts are split in determining whether the
religious employer exemption under Title VII applies to
employment practices which violate Title VII on a nonreligious ground. Courts should not try to determine whether
a n employee's activities are central to the religion's mission.
Rather, the courts should focus on whether the employment
practice is religiously based. If so, the exemption applies. If
the employment practice is not religiously based, then the
religious employer is subject to the dictates of Title VII just
as any other employer.
To fall under the religious employer exemption, a n employer would have to show by clear and convincing evidence
that its employment practice is religiously based. This showing values' the state's interest in eliminating employment
discrimination, while keeping the courts from influencing the
religion's autonomy to practice its religion as it sees fit and
pursuing its goals through its employment practices.

Treaver Hodson

144. 626 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
145. See 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-l(a) (West Supp. 1994).

